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On December 8, 1999, the Department of Energy (DOE) published Title 10 CFR 850 
(hereafter referred to as the Rule) to establish a chronic beryllium disease prevention 
program (CBDPP) to:  
• reduce the number of workers currently exposed to beryllium in the course of 
their work at DOE facilities managed by DOE or its contractors,   
• minimize the levels of, and potential for, exposure to beryllium, and   
• establish medical surveillance requirements to ensure early detection of the 
disease.  
  
On January 4, 2001, DOE issued DOE G 440.1-7A, Implementation Guide for use with 10 
CFR 850, Chronic Beryllium Disease Prevention Program, to assist line managers in 
meeting their responsibilities for implementing the CBDPP.  That guide describes methods 
and techniques that DOE considers acceptable in complying with the Rule. 
 
In 2005 a draft DOE Technical Standard “Management of Items and Areas Containing 
Low Levels of Beryllium” (SAFT 0103; hereafter referred to as the “TS”) was circulated 
for comment (http://www.hss.energy.gov/NuclearSafety/techstds/tsdrafts/saft-0103.pdf). 
DOE technical standards are voluntary consensus standards developed when industry 
standards do not exist (see http://www.hss.energy.gov/NuclearSafety/techstds/index.html 
for more information). This TS is intended to supplement the Rule by describing best 
practices and lessons learned for managing items and areas that contain low levels of 
beryllium and are not included in the scope of the Rule, as well as determining if the Rule's 
housekeeping and release criteria are met. 
 
Among the many comments on the draft TS was a suggestion that certain of the statistical 
comparisons described in the TS could be better implemented if “raw” data were to be 
reported by analytical laboratories. Exactly what is meant by “raw” in this White Paper is 
described in more detail below. 
 
The Beryllium Health and Safety Committee (BHSC) formed a Sampling and Analysis 
Subcommittee (SAS) in 2003. The SAS established a working group on accreditation and 
reporting limits. By 2006 it had become evident that the issues extended to data reporting 
as a whole. The SAS proposed to the BHSC the formation of a Data Reporting Task 
Force (DRTF) to consider issues related to data reporting. The BHSC Board agreed, and 
requested that the DRTF generate a white paper, to be offered by the BHSC to potential 
interested parties such as the DOE beryllium policy office. It was noted that additional 
products could include detailed guidance and potentially a journal article in the future. 
The SAS proposed that membership represent the affected disciplines (chemists, IH 
professionals, statisticians, and DOE-HQ policy). The BHSC Board decided that DRTF 
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membership should come from DOE sites, since the focus would be on reporting in the 
context of the TS and the Rule. The DRTF came into existence in late 2006. 
 
Teleconferences ensued, during which the following statement of purpose was 
developed: “The purpose of the Data Reporting Task Force is to harmonize perspectives 
among chemists, lab managers, statisticians, industrial hygienists, and policy personnel 
with respect to how laboratory reporting limits are determined, and how data at or below 
those limits are reported.” A lack of a consensus on data reporting issues is one barrier to 
the adoption of a technical standard and the DRTF seeks to create consensus on these 
issues. 
 
A face-to-face meeting of approximately half the members of the DRTF was held 
February 6 and 7, 2007. Many of the other members participated by telephone. 
 
This White Paper summarizes issues discussed during the February 2007 meeting, and 




Since the DRTF is chartered by the BHSC, any recommendations developed by the 
DRTF will be delivered to the full BHSC for consideration, and then offered by the 




In this White Paper the terms “detection limit”, “quantitation limit”, and “reporting limit” 
are generic. They represent any of a large number of different methods and formulas that 
have been developed in the last 40 years or so to represent various aspects of an 
analytical method’s ability to detect and measure the presence of a specified analyte in an 
environmental sample. One widely used detection limit is the U.S. EPA’s “method 
detection limit”, defined in 40 CFR 136 Appendix B (hereafter referred to as EPA MDL). 
The actual values of these limits, in practice, may be established by individual labs (and 
thus vary between labs), or may be client-specified. 
 
In this White Paper the term “raw result” refers to a number, produced by an analytical 
measurement system, that is intended to estimate the concentration of the analyte in the 
sample. A raw result may be above or below any of the types of limits mentioned above, 
or even negative (< zero). Whether or not an analytical method can actually produce a 
negative number depends on the details of the method. Some do. Negative numbers are 
not interpreted to mean that there is a negative amount of the analyte in the sample, but 
rather that intrinsic analytical variation (including noise in the system) produces a scatter 
of values, and that scatter may include negative values, depending on the details of the 
method. For example, the ICP-AES method when used for beryllium can produce 
negative values. 
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In this White Paper the term “censoring” refers to the practice of reporting an analytical 
result as “less than” a limit (any kind of limit), when the raw result is less than that limit. 
For example, if a raw result is 0.03, and the limit being used is 0.05, then a report of 
“<0.05” would be considered censoring. More specifically, this is left censoring. Right 
censoring, where a result as reported as “>xx” can occur as well; however, this is less 
relevant to the issues considered herein. 
 
The basic issue 
 
The draft TS proposed using statistical analyses of sets of samples to characterize 
potential beryllium contamination of facilities and equipment, and in particular, decide 
whether facilities or equipment may be released for uncontrolled use.  
 
 
Surface wipe samples have been the main method used for such assessments and 
decisions. Results from relatively clean surfaces are often below laboratory reporting 
limits. Such censored (“less than”) data is more difficult to interpret using conventional 
statistical methods than are detected results. This led to a proposal to report and use raw 
data to support statistically-based decisions on whether surface contamination exceeds 
action levels such as those  specified in 10 CFR 850. 
 
Thus, with regard to the primary issue of data reporting, there are two basic points of 
view: 
 
• Using all raw data can improve statistical evaluations, and in particular allow 
release decisions to be made with statistical confidence with fewer samples than if 
censored, and should therefore be an acceptable way of reporting data (i.e., 
available upon request). 
 
• Reporting raw data opens the door to misuse of the reported results, since raw 
data do not always represent detectable levels of Be. Raw data are at best highly 
uncertain, and in many cases are not “real numbers.” Moreover, such reporting 
might threaten a laboratory’s accreditation, be inconsistent with accepted 
technical practices, and create risk communication problems. 
 
A second potential issue is whether or not the DRTF should make recommendations on 
what kind or kinds of limits should be used in the context of the laboratory accreditation 
requirement of the Rule. The topic of different types of limits, what they mean, and how 




During the 2/2007 meeting the DRTF developed this “problem definition” list: 
 
 Page 4 of 10 UCRL-TR-229150 
• We need a common set of terms for the limits used by laboratories analyzing for 
beryllium under 10CFR850, to promote consistency and minimize 
miscommunication. 
• We need a consistent approach to calculating and using limits. 
• We need to evaluate the No Censoring approach, and when and where it would be 
appropriate to use it 
• We need to provide optimal approach(es) to reporting data based on identified data 
quality objectives (and thereby need to clarify DQO needs) 
• We will need to provide education to end users regarding any recommendations we 
develop. 
 
Decisions made based on the data need to be defensible. The way in which the data are 
reported must support the intended use. Therefore, it is possible that data may need to be 
reported differently, depending on the project or purpose for which the samples were 
collected. 
 
There was some discussion at the 2/2007 meeting of what, exactly, are the regulatory 
drivers, and to what sampling situations and what types of decisions do they apply. For 
example, facilities (buildings) are different from equipment (computers, telephones, even 
an instrumentation trailer), and the decision process for them may be very different. It is 
easy to visualize a decision about a facility being based on summary statistics from 
multiple samples from the facility, but hardly practical to imagine a similar data analysis 
process for, say, half a dozen desktop computers. More likely, each will be assessed 
individually. The Rule itself establishes contamination control requirements for ongoing 
beryllium operations. 
 
Section 10 CFR 850.31 “Release Criteria” establishes levels of cleanliness that should be 
achieved prior to release of contaminated equipment.  Paragraph 850.31(b)(1) states “The 
removable contamination level of equipment or item surfaces does not exceed the higher 
of 0.2 µg/100 cm2 or the concentration level of beryllium in soil at the point or release, 
whichever is greater.” The rule does not specify how many samples should be used in 
making the determination, nor does it specify a metric (such as average or maximum) if 
more than one sample is used.   The 0.2 µg/100 cm2 surface loading criteria is based on 
experience indicating this level of cleanliness can be achieved with ordinary cleaning 
methods.   
 
Due to the lack of more specific guidance, these criteria have been extended to the 
interpretation of surface wipe sampling for baseline surveys to determine whether legacy 
beryllium contamination from past operations may exist.  The TS was drafted to create 
guidance more tailored to managing low levels of legacy contamination.  The Multi-
Agency Radiation Survey and Site Investigation Manual (MARSSIM) was used as a 
model for much of the TS. MARSSIM establishes sampling strategies and decision logic 
for the conduct of surveys for low levels of legacy radioactive contamination (see 
http://www.epa.gov/radiation/marssim/index.html.) However, reporting limits are not 
addressed in MARSSIM as methods are usually able to measure background levels of 
radiation.  MARSSIM assumes data will not be censored.  
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The decision criterion included in the TS is adopted from common Industrial Hygiene 
practice: a facility is declared “acceptable” if the 95%-95% Upper Tolerance Limit (UTL;  
the upper 95th confidence limit for the 95th percentile of the distribution of all possible 
measurements in the facility), is less than the 10 CFR 850 DOE Release Criterion (0.2 
µg/100 cm2). The following is a formal statement of the statistical test represented by the 
95%-95% UTL procedure: 
  
Null Hypothesis; greater than 5% of surfaces in a survey unit exceed removable 
beryllium contamination limit; and  
 
Alternative Hypothesis; less than 5% of surfaces in a survey unit exceed 
removable beryllium contamination limit.   
 
Although one would like to think that a preponderance of non-detections from a given 
facility should make it easier to declare a facility “acceptable”, paradoxically it becomes 
more difficult to make that decision with higher proportions of censored data.  This is 
because high proportions of censored data make the more efficient parametric statistical 
methods unavailable. 
 
Note that the UTL formulation assumes that the facility is “not clean” unless and until a 
statistical test shows that (with a 5% “false clean” error rate) that it is “clean.” This 
parallels, for example, EPA procedures for deciding that a waste stream is non-
hazardous. One would hope that the cleaner the facility, the easier it is to show that it is 




If a different decision criterion were to be employed, it is possible that the adverse effect 
of censoring on the data analysis would not be as great. However, the current statistically-
based criterion was chosen, at least in part, to ensure a relatively objective decision based 
on a sufficient number of samples, rather than expert opinion or intuitive approaches that 
are not straight forward to defend or document. A standard procedure (followed by all 
users), documented by numeric values and mathematical calculations using recognized 
statistical procedures provides for a strong legal basis for decisions. Statistically planned 
decision-making was included in the TS in order to control, to an acceptably low level of 
probability, the chance of incorrectly deciding that a facility is clean.  It applies to 
decisions made from samples from a small percentage of the surfaces being 
characterized.  
 
Day-to-day risk management may require determining whether a specific piece of 
equipment or location is contaminated.  These decisions are usually made from a single 
or a few samples intended to directly determine contamination levels of the surfaces that 
will be worked on.  This is sometimes called diagnostic rather than statistically planned 
sampling and is not affected by censoring as long as the reporting limit is well below the 
regulatory limit. 
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Current data reporting practices are driven by laboratory accreditation policies aimed at 
assuring results meet specified levels of accuracy.  Standard practices for implementing 
these policies incorporate EPA methods mandated for analyses of waste water (method 
detection limits, MDLs, from 40CFR136; see the Terminology section above).  These 
approaches have been used in EPA-based programs for many, many years, and are 
mandated for some work performed by environmental chemistry laboratories. 
Accreditation organizations view existing procedures as simple QA metrics and have 
therefore adopted them. For example, the AIHA requires the use of the 40CFR136 
definition of MDL in its environmental lead program. This method has also been widely 
used for other metals for various reasons, including AIHA auditor requests, and to 
standardize MDL calculations with the lab. From the laboratory’s point of view, if it must 
do a particular procedure for one program, then using the same procedure for other 
programs is easiest. There was an extensive discussion during the 2/2007 meeting of the 
history of EPA methods and their limitations. 
 
The EPA has established a Federal Advisory Committee as a first step in court-ordered 
revision of its detection limit methods, which is controversial due to the potential 
regulatory ramifications.  Overall, the DRTF concluded that EPA revisions to the MDL 
were unlikely to affect its work. More promising are other published methods for 
establishing reporting limits that can reduce censoring without being impractical due to 
complexity and be accepted by accrediting organizations as “equivalent” to EPA MDL 
methods. The DRTF charter does not include detection limit research or development. 
 
Another external factor is a notice by the American Conference of Governmental 
Industrial Hygienist of its intent to lower its occupational exposure limit (OEL) for 
beryllium.  Adoption of this OEL would make lower reporting limits for analyses of 
beryllium samples desirable.  This may lead to the use of more sensitive instruments.  
Reductions in reporting limits are also possible through use of more complex calibration 
methods than those that incorporate the EPA MDL.  This creates a reason for considering 
alternatives for establishing lower reporting limits that still meet accreditation policies for 
the accuracy of individual results.   
 
Yet another external factor is the requirement of ISO 17025 to provide uncertainty 
information with reported data points.  Addressing this requirement is among the options 
being considered by the DRTF. 
 
Contamination characterization decisions at the facility level are most often made from 
aggregated data.  In this setting, objectives can be met by using data in which individual 
results have lower levels of accuracy if they provide useful information on the distance 
between measured levels and the regulatory limits. Lower level raw data, which has 
greater relative uncertainty than results above a quantitation limit, still provide useful 
information on the distance between measured levels and regulatory limits. There is a 
concern, however, that low-level (below detection limit) raw data, if made available for 
appropriate statistical analysis, might be misused in other applications.  Therefore, if raw 
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data for statistical analysis is made available, it is expected that limits on the use of that 
data will be necessary. 
 
Two types of intended use of analytical data need to be considered: 
 
• Assessments based on the results of a single sample. These are typically exposure 
assessments for a single individual. For example, a single sample result is 
compared with an OEL. 
 
• Assessments of a facility, item, or collection of items. These are typically 
comparisons of the levels in a facility with a release level, and are based on 
statistical analysis of data sets containing multiple samples. For example, a 95%-
95% upper tolerance limit is compared with a release level. 
 
The challenge for the DRTF will be to recommend methods that can accommodate these 
objectives while avoiding the potential for misuse or misinterpretation that accreditation 




The DRTF is considering two options for how to move forward.  The first of these would 
be that the DRTF would not offer any new guidance.  Laboratories performing analyses 
of surface samples for Be according to the TS and 10 CFR 850 would continue to report 
estimated concentrations only when they have good confidence in the number, and 
continue to report “less than” results as they have been. 
 
A second option would be for the DRTF to offer guidance on the possible use of raw data 
for decisions based on data sets. Reporting of raw data would be negotiated between a 
project and its analytical laboratory; no lab would be forced to report such data, and the 
responsibility for its use (and protection against misuse) would be the responsibility of 
the project (not the lab). In order to ameliorate the accreditation issue, the official result, 
the one the Lab would be required to “stand behind”, would follow current practices 
(typically, censored at a reporting limit). 
 
A third option would be for the DRTF to offer recommendations on the use of established 
standards, such as ISO 17025, to provide uncertainty information with reported data 
points.  Some combination of the second and third options could be considered. 
 
 
The Path Forward 
 
The DRTF has identified four areas of activities that need to be performed, as follows: 
• Writing – developing this white paper and offering guidance to interested parties.  
It could also include writing of other documents, such as voluntary consensus 
standards or journal articles, if that is deemed appropriate at a later time.  Such 
 Page 8 of 10 UCRL-TR-229150 
activities would likely fall outside of the 12-18 month time window presently 
envisioned for the DRTF. 
• Accreditation – ensuring that DRTF guidance is evaluated against existing AIHA 
accreditation requirements.  If necessary, any needed changes to AIHA policy 
would be negotiated with AIHA, but in any case should remain consistent with 
ISO 17025. 
• Technical issues – evaluating the technical issues before the DRTF for 
development of guidance as described above.  Among these tasks include the 
following: 
o Development of a matrix listing the different needs for analytical data and 
the reporting requirements/options associated with those needs. 
o Evaluation of various types of reporting. 
o Evaluation of a performance-based “standard” for calculating reporting 
limits. 
o Evaluation of other options such as providing uncertainty intervals with 
the data. 
• Education/risk communication – developing education and risk communication 
material to be presented to the beryllium community to aid in data reporting, 
statistical evaluations, and decision-making based on reported data. 
 
The DRTF has agreed that the existing Accreditation Working Group (part of the 
Sampling and Analysis Subcommittee) should address the accreditation issues cited 
above.  For the other activities, the DRTF has established sub-groups as follows: 
 
• Writing Group: Don MacQueen (lead), Melecita Archuleta, Paul Wambach, 
David Weitzman 
• Technical Issues Group: Tom Oatts (lead), Charles Davis, Nancy Grams, Burney 
Hook, Jim Robbins, Gary Whitney 
• Education/Risk Communication Group: George Fulton, Don Harvey, Rohit Shah 
 
The first two of these groups are currently active; the third group will become active at a 
later time when the other groups generate specific guidance.  Until that time, members of 
the Education/Risk Communication group will participate with one of the two active 
groups. 
 
The initial product of the DRTF is the present document, a draft version of the white 
paper, in time for review by the BHSC at its March 2007 meeting.  A specific timeline 




As an ancillary function, the DRTF will continue to follow the progress of the EPA 
Office of Water Federal Advisory Committee on Detection and Quantification (FACDQ), 
which will propose changes to 40 CFR 136 including the EPA’s Method Detection Limit.  
The DRTF anticipates preparing comments during the public comment period on these 
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changes.  Such comments would be provided to interested BHSC members who may 
wish to use them to make comments. 
 
The DRTF charter is for guidance on beryllium data reporting . However, similar issues 
exist with trace-level analyses in areas such as environmental monitoring. It may be that 
what the DRTF is able to accomplish for beryllium may be useful to other groups with 




This white paper presents the reasons for the formation of the DRTF, a summary of the 
issues that the DRTF intends to address, its activities to date, and the path forward for 
resolution of the open issues.  The benefits should include more consistent data reporting, 
better field decision-making, better understanding of the results by end users, and 
possibly a reduction (in some instances) in the number of samples required and 
associated sampling/analysis costs.  Also, since data reporting issues were a key area of 
comments on the initial draft TS, guidance developed by the DRTF will be offered to the 





Appendix – Detection limit concepts 
 
The DRTF believes it is important to understand detection limits, how they are 
developed, and what they mean, in order to develop recommendations for data reporting. 
  
Most if not all detection limits in use today can be viewed as variations of the system of 
limits proposed by Lloyd Currie in Analytical Chemistry in 1968.  These include: 
 
• LC:  A level above which an instrument signal cannot credibly have come from a 
sample in which the analyte is not present. Such a signal is therefore considered 
to represent a “detection” of the analyte.  
• LD: A level that satisfies the following: when analyzing samples that are truly at 
or above LD, the instrument signal is unlikely to be below LC. That is, the analyte 
is highly likely to be detected (detected based on the LC criterion). 
• LQ: A level at which the estimated concentration in the sample has a low relative 
uncertainty (e.g., 10 to 20 percent). 
In addition to the above is the concept of a reporting limit (or contract reporting limit), in 
which a laboratory and its client agree that if the estimated concentration is above the 
reporting limit, the laboratory will report the estimated concentration, otherwise it will 
report that the analyte was below the reporting limit. 
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